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Abstract
This paper attempts to revive interest in the speech act
theory of literature by looking into Monroe C. Beardsley’s
account in particular. Beardsley’s view in this respect has
received, surprisingly, less attention than deserved. I first
offer a reconstruction of Beardsley’s account and then use it
to correct some notable misconceptions. Next, I show that
the reformulation reveals a hitherto unnoticed discrepancy
in Beardsley’s position and that this can be explained away
by a weak version of intentionalism that Beardsley himself
actually tolerates. Finally, I assess the real difficulty of
Beardsley’s theory and its relevance today.
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Speech act theory was originally proposed and
developed by J. L. Austin to explain deeds per-
formed by utterances in particular contexts.1 His
focus is mainly on illocutionary acts, that is, speech
acts performed in using language. The operational
schema can be described at the most general level:
an illocutionary act is generated by intentional text
production under appropriate conditions, according
to certain language conventions.
The influence of Austin’s work has gone beyond
the philosophy of language. Many literary theorists
and philosophers have applied this machinery to
literary studies. One notable attempt is the effort to
define literature based on Austin’s remark that an
illocution loses its force in artistic contexts. Among
others, Richard Ohmann distinguishes literary
texts from non-literary ones by defining the former
as mimetic illocutions.2 This model is adapted by
Charles Altieri to discuss poetry.3 Along similar
lines, John Searle argues that fictional utterances,
in contrast to ordinary ones, are pretended speech
acts.4 An opposing view is given by Mary Louise
Pratt, who tries to blur that distinction, showing
that literary and non-literary discourses can be
analyzed on the same model.5 The said distinction
is again challenged and criticized by Stanley Fish.6
The application of speech act theory to litera-
ture7 has faced many challenges, both from
philosophers and literary critics. Joseph Margolis
rejects speech act theory itself and its literary
applications, claiming the whole project is doomed
at the very start8; Roger D. Sell criticizes the
theory’s leading to depersonalized and decontex-
tualized readings of literary works, advocating a
historical literary pragmatics that treats writing
as an act of communication between real authors
and real readers.9 Though the heyday of the
literary deployment of speech act theory has
gone, there are occasional efforts to revive its
interest. A notable example is by J. Hillis Miller,
who attempts a speech act reading of literary works
by Proust and Henry James.10
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Beardsley proposed his speech act theory
of literature when such deployment became a
trend. Similar to Ohman and Searle, he espouses
a formalist and anti-pragmatist position on read-
ing literature, holding that fictional works are
illocutionary-act representations. This construal of
literature is in one sense dated, as opposed to the
more recent trend of literary pragmatics, and this
may be part of the reason why Beardsley’s work
in this respect has received scarce attention. But
what is often neglected is that Beardsley’s speech
act theory of literature is strongly linked to his
early and more influential proposal: the intentional
fallacy. His literary applications of speech act
theory are deeply connected to the intentional
fallacy and should be understood in that context.
If we think that the intentional fallacy is still
relevant today, that the problem of intention and
interpretation is still a thought-provoking problem
to be resolved, then reconsidering the Beardsleyan
speech act theory may prove helpful and enligh-
tening for both the philosophy of literature and
literary studies.
In what follows I aim (1) to offer a reconstruction
of Beardsley’s account*even such a reconstruc-
tion is hard to find in the literature; (2) to use this
reconstruction to correct some misconceptions;
(3) to show that the reconstruction reveals a
hitherto unnoticed discrepancy in Beardsley’s
view, and that this can be explained away by a
weak version of intentionalism that Beardsley
himself actually tolerates; (4) to assess the real




The rule-governed nature of illocutionary acts
is crucial in that Beardsley notably denies the
relevance of speaker’s intention in determining
the correct illocutionary act being performed. An
illocutionary act can be performed unintentionally
in the sense that it is not necessary for the speaker
to have the corresponding intention to perform
that illocutionary act.11 Notice that this intention
is not the default intention in ‘‘intentional text
production.’’
To demonstrate the point, suppose the following
conditions hold: (1) I know that you are looking
for an Agatha Christie to read. (2) I believe that
you have read At Bertram’s Hotel. (3) I do not know
that actually you have not read it. (4) I think that
it is not worth reading. (5) I gather that you plan to
read At Bertram’s Hotel. Under these conditions,
my utterance of the sentence to you ‘‘A Murder Is
Announced is ten times better than At Bertram’s
Hotel’’ constitutes the illocutionary act of advising
you to seek A Murder Is Announced to read. This
act is performed intentionally, that is, with the
intention to give you advice. But at the same time,
there is another illocutionary act being performed
unintentionally: that of discouraging you from
reading At Bertram’s Hotel.
It follows that performing an illocutionary act
has nothing to do with having as its condition an
intention to perform that act. We do not need
to know the speaker’s intention to determine
which illocutionary act is being performed, which
is solely a function of relevant conditions and
conventions.
Beardsley claims that the nature of fiction is
representation. In its broad sense, a representa-
tion is a symbolic vehicle standing for something
else. By this definition, words, texts, paintings, or
sculptures are all representations. Plainly, Beards-
ley’s use of the term is narrower.
Representation involves what Beardsley calls
selective similarity.12 For X to be able to represent
Y, X must bear some crucial aspects that can
be perceived to be a characteristic of Y but falls
short of being Y. In the pictorial context, we know
that a painting is a depiction of, say, a smiling
face because its content exhibits selective respects
distinctive of a real smiling face. The painting
is hence a representation of a smiling face. In the
case of dramatic representation, we know that
a mime is representing the act of, say, climbing a
ladder because her body language shows crucial
aspects that are characteristics of ladder climbing.
Her act is one of imitation.
Representation, according to Beardsley, is best
understood as some kind of reference: X refers
to Y if X represents Y. Such reference may be
intentional at the very beginning of the practice of
representation, in the sense that what is referred to
is determined by the referrer’s intention. However,
once the conventions of a particular kind of
representation are established, unintentional re-
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Such being the case, we can have different
conventions for representing things. Needless to
say, the content of representation in most cases
corresponds to what one intends to represent,
but what one does represent in the end depends
on the relevant conventions. It might also happen
that one intends to perform some action but
ends up representing it instead, if the action is
incomplete. This is to say that representation can
be unintentional in the sense that the intention to
represent is not necessary for producing a repre-
sentation. Of course, when the performance fails
one might end up representing nothing at all, if
the similarity produced is insufficient.14
So far we can see that a representation is in place
when an attempted action is incompletely per-
formed but is still discernible in what has been
done. Then, what is a representation of an illocu-
tionary act per se? Verbal representation works in
the same way as visual or dramatic representation:
an illocutionary-act representation obtains when
the conditions present are not sufficient for the
act in question actually to occur. I will define an
obtaining condition of an illocutionary-act repre-
sentation as an infelicity condition of an illocution-
ary-act performance. And this will presuppose
that the attempted action is always of a recogniz-
able kind as in the current context talking about
unintelligible actions is out of place. An example of
the obtaining condition for an illocutionary-act
representation will be the absence of uptake. That
is, the utterance is not heard and understood by
the audience. The illocution hence loses its force
and becomes a representation.
The case of intentional verbal representation
is a special case of refraining from illocutionary
commitment in order to produce a fiction.15 For
instance, when you catch someone stealing your
wallet and say ‘‘You stole my wallet!’’, you are
performing an illocutionary act of accusation. But,
when an actress during a performance says ‘‘You
stole my wallet!’’, she is not performing an illocu-
tionary act of accusation but only representing one;
she is refraining from an illocutionary commitment
in order to produce a fiction or imitation.
This is not to exclude the case in which the
actress intends to represent some other illocution-
ary act but ends up representing the one of
accusation due to a slip of tongue. The point is
that, as representation is a matter of conven-
tion, what is represented is solely determined by
convention. Furthermore, just as a failure to per-
form an act may end up with a representation,
so a failure to perform an illocutionary act might
end up with an illocutionary-act representation
because of the absence of uptake from the audi-
ence, for example.
It is now clear that a representation or imitation
is essentially a fiction. The drawing of a smiling
face is a fictional smiling face; the represented
action of climbing a ladder by a mime is a fictional
action of ladder climbing; the illocution-act re-
presentation of accusing someone is a fictional
illocutionary act of accusation, and so on.
FICTION, NONFICTION, AND
INTERPRETATION
Before we see how the said notions find their
places in literature, some important terms should
be specified. First, Beardsley uses the word author
to refer to anyone who intentionally produces a
text. Thus a parrot or a speaking dreamer is not
an author. To mean something, someone inten-
tionally produces a text and in doing so intends to
say something. The word ‘‘say’’ covers two differ-
ent kinds of speech act: illocutionary acts and their
representations.16
Second, a compound illocutionary act is defined
as a set of illocutionary acts performed in one
single text. A literary text, either fictional or
nonfictional, can be seen as reflecting a compound
illocutionary act.17
Third, in every literary work we can envisage
an implicit speaker18 who performs the compound
illocutionary act, and ‘‘whose words the work
purports to be.’’19
Now, let us consider the case of literary fiction.
Typically, these are fictional narratives such as
novels, short stories, and plays. The crucial ques-
tion is: why does Beardsley think of them as
representations or imitations of illocutionary acts?
This is because we can always discern in them the
infelicity conditions of an illocutionary-act perfor-
mance, that is, the obtaining conditions of an
illocutionary-act representation. These conditions
can be seen as the marks of fictionality, which
make fictional the illocutionary acts performed in
the work.
A first point to consider is whether we should
identify the implicit speaker with the author. If the
answer is no, the author must be representing the
Beardsley on literature, fiction and nonfiction
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illocutionary act performed by the implicit speaker.
This speaker typically appears in two ways:
(1) she tells the story behind the scenes and never
reveals herself; (2) she narrates from the first
person perspective as one of the characters in the
story world.20
The identification is certainly wrong in the
second case: no one would identify Dr. Watson
with Conan Doyle, who in most Holmes’ adven-
tures is only imitating the compound illocutionary
act performed by a fictional speaker.
It is perhaps less clear why such identification in
the first case is also illegitimate. A quick example
may help. Consider the following passage from
Ngaio Marsh’s mystery novel Artists in Crime, in
which an artist’s model is murdered:
She examined the body. She states that the
eyelids fluttered and the limbs jerked slightly.
Miss Bostock attempted to raise Gluck. She
placed her hand behind the shoulders and
pulled. There was a certain amount of
resistance, but after a few seconds the body
came up suddenly. Miss Seacliff cried out
loudly that there was blood on the blue silk
drape.21
If we take this passage to be an illocutionary
act performed by the implicit speaker, it would be
one of describing a crime scene. However, given
that the event is not real (no model called Gluck
dies in the way described by Marsh), and that
the names mentioned here do not refer to actual
people (there might be someone called Gluck,
Miss Bostock, or Miss Seacliff around us, but we
cannot find a perfect match in the real world),
the illocutionary act of describing this particular
event is not likely to occur. The act is thus
pretend. This explains why a fictional narrative
is a representation of a compound22 illocutionary
act in nature; there are always nonreferring names
and descriptions in such a work that make
fictional the narrator and the illocutionary acts
performed by her.23
Beardsley is unusual in holding that, apart from
narrative fiction, there is a second literary category
that should also be taken as fiction, and thus as a
form of representation: lyric poetry.24 Sometimes
the infelicity conditions in such poems are easy to
discern. Beardsley’s example is the sonnet by John
Keats that begins with the line ‘‘Bright Star! Would
I were steadfast as thou art*.’’ The speaker here is
addressing the star but apparently uptake from the
addressee is impossible. The purported illocution-
ary act is not likely to happen, and Keats is hence
only imitating the act of praising performed by the
implicit speaker.
One compelling reason for treating lyrics as
illocutionary acts is that they are typically spoken
from the first person point of view to express
personal feelings and sentiments. It seems natural
and right to identify the speaker in the poem with
the author, and thus to attribute those feelings
and sentiments to the author, when no obvious
infelicity conditions are present. Take for instance
the poem ‘‘Thoughts on a Silent Night’’ by the
ancient Chinese poet Li Bai:
Before my bed a pool of light*
O can it be frost on the ground?
Eyes raised, I see the moon so bright;
Head bent; in homesickness I’m drowned.25
Though researchers do not seem to have any
evidence that Li Bai based this poem on true
experience, it is very intuitive and tempting for us
to assume he did, and hence to identify the speaker
in the poem with him. But one would find this kind
of identification problematic if one came to know
who wrote the following poem only after reading it:
With Northern grass like green silk thread,
Western mulberries bend their head.
When you think of your home on your part,
Already broken is my heart.26
This lyric poem, titled ‘‘A Faithful Wife Longing
for Her Husband in Spring,’’ is a poem about a
woman grieving over her husband’s absence due
to military service. Simply put, the illocutionary
act performed by the lonely wife seems to be one
of complaining about the absence of her beloved.
At first glance, one might suspect that it was
written by a female poet. But surprisingly, this
poem is also Li Bai’s work. It will be absolutely
wrong to identify the speaker in the poem with
the author because Li Bai is a male and does not
have any husband. It is impossible that he ever had
the emotional experience described in the poem.
Li Bai in this case is representing the illocutionary
act performed by a lonely wife. One would be yet
more surprised to find that Li Bai actually wrote
more poems from a female perspective, imitating
various types of illocutionary acts that express
women’s emotions and feelings.
So far it is clear why Beardsley rejects the
identification of the speaker in a lyric with its
S.-Y. Lin
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author. If this identification is universal, what is
true of the speaker must be true of the author,
and vice versa. But the truth is that there is no
necessary link between what is expressed in a lyric
and its author. A lyric is hence best treated as an
illocutionary-act representation, rather than as an
illocutionary act.
Another reason for rejecting lyrics as genuine
illocutionary acts is the so-called address without
access, which constitutes the primary mark of
fictionality.27 A published poem is not addressed
to a reader the way a love letter is to him or her.
The latter is done in a pragmatic context, which
the former lacks.28 The absence of a pragmatic
context gives us no reason to identify the implicit
speaker with the author, who could just be imitat-
ing someone else’s speech acts. This is because
the act of publishing a poem gives it an impersonal
public character. This second locutionary act,
to be distinguished from the first of producing
the text, detaches the poem from the occasion of
utterance and gives us no guarantee that the author
is performing an illocutionary act. The poem is
hence ‘‘freed of illocutionary dependence on its
occasion.’’29
It can be seen that the above reason also applies
to narrative fiction. I see no problem in thinking of
it also as the reason for treating literary fiction as
representational in general.
What about nonfictional works? They tend to
have strong realistic elements and lack marks of
fictionality, or infelicity conditions.30 As Beardsley
indicates, many pieces of discursive prose are duly
classified as nonfiction, including history, philoso-
phy, religious meditations, and personal essays.31
And it seems wrong to say that the illocutionary
acts made in these works are pretend. For example,
if a poet publishes an antiwar poem during war-
time, it seems inappropriate to see the utterance as
a mere representation devoid of the illocutionary
force of opposing war.32
One might object that here Beardsley is self-
defeating, given his view that ‘‘address without
access’’ is a mark of fictionality. Beardsley has a
response. When considering the antiwar poem
it is hard to deny that publishing such a poem in
the context of its production is very close to using
or presenting that text, given that there are no other
marks of fictionality present. It is better to treat
the context in question as a pragmatic one in
which it is legitimate to identify the author with the
implicit speaker.
There are indeed reasons for making this move.
As Beardsley points out, nonfictional works tend
to be published in a more formal style and targeted
at a particular audience.33 For example, many of
Confucius’s sayings are addressed to political
rulers; a large part of Kierkegaard’s literary writ-
ings is addressed to the Church. There is a sense
of intimacy with the reader in this kind of work,
in which the author is keen to secure proper uptake
from the intended audience; that is, she is not
addressing without access. But this strong sense of
communication is absent from fictional works.
The conclusion we can draw at this stage is
that, by rejecting the said mark of fictionality,
published nonfictional works are justified as genuine
illocutionary acts performed by their authors.
Beardsley draws on what has been argued so
far to shed new light on his anti-intentionalism
on literary interpretation. As I see it, his complete
argument based on speech act theory comes in
two parts, in which he tries to show that inten-
tion is twice removed from an illocutionary-act
representation.
First, the author’s intention is not constitutive of
illocutionary meaning (of which illocutionary act
is performed) because performing an illocutionary
act does not require the author’s intention. As
nonfictional works are genuine illocutions, it fol-
lows that the author’s intention is neither necessary
nor sufficient in determining their meanings.
But even if authorial intent did play a role in
fixing the meaning of an illocution, the same would
not hold with its representation. These are cases in
which authors appear to withhold illocutionary
force in order to produce representations. As the
content of a representation is fully determined
by convention, authorial intent is logically inde-
pendent of meaning-shaping. And since fictional
works are illocutionary-act representations by their
very nature, the author’s intention is then irrele-
vant to what such works mean.34
Beardsley concludes that the intentional fal-
lacy comes from the following confusions: (1) of
illocutionary-act performance with its representa-
tion; (2) of authorial meaning with textual mean-
ing (what was intended with what was actually
said); (3) of the real author with the implicit speaker;
(4) of the subject of the work with the occasion of its
utterance. These confusions are implicated in the
Beardsley on literature, fiction and nonfiction
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intentionalist argument that consists of two
sub-arguments: from biographical data35 to prob-
able intentions, and from probable intentions to
work meaning. The first argument is legitimate,
while the second is invalid and is a fallacy. It is this
latter type of reasoning that Beardsley is strongly
opposed to.36
OBJECTIONS TO BEARDSLEY’S
SPEECH ACT THEORY OF LITERATURE
We can clarify Beardsley’s view further by answer-
ing some representative objections before we
continue with the issue of interpretation.
George Dickie, though sharing Beardsley’s anti-
intentionalism, is not satisfied with the speech
act argument and points out two problems.37
The minor problem is that the argument applies
only to fictional works. However, Beardsley’s
complete argument works with all literary works
with respect to the autonomy of textual meaning,
as I just showed.
Dickie’s major criticism is that Beardsley is not
addressing the real debate, which is on locutionary
meaning rather than illocutionary meaning. This
criticism is doubtful for the following reasons.
First, it seems that illocutionary meaning does
figure in the real debate. For example, Beardsley’s
major rival E. D. Hirsch implicitly raises the
question about illocutionary meaning when asking
whether the statement ‘‘Pass the salt’’ is an order,
a command, or an entreaty.38 Moreover, if we
accept that irony, allusion and metaphor take place
at the illocutionary level, a matter that participants
in the debate argue over, they constitute strong
counterexamples to anti-intentionalism.39
Second, what kind of ‘‘meaning’’ is the real
debate about? Christopher New distinguishes four
levels of meaning figuring in the debate: (1) the
vocabulary level (the correct words used); (2) the
locutionary level; (3) the illocutionary level; (4)
the suprasentential level (themes and theses).
Dickie’s favorite example of misspeaking is at
the vocabulary level40; Sirridge engages anti-
intentionalism at the same level. Noe¨l Carroll
defines the meaning of a work as its ‘‘themes and
theses,’’ which correspond to the suprasentential
level.41 Peter Lamarque also thinks that the debate
should be engaged at this level.42 All this shows
how divided the opinions are. The most we can say
is that locutionary meaning is undoubtedly part of
the real debate, but it is not the debate.
Third, an important point: Beardsley does not
abandon the discussion of verbal meaning but
addresses it indirectly. As the meaning of a word
or phrase will affect which illocutionary act the
sentence in which it occurs reflects, such determi-
nation of meaning is done by considering which
choice of meaning contributes most coherently to
the illocutionary act reflected in the text.43
Carroll presents four attacks on the soundness
of Beardsley’s argument.44 The first is that
Beardsley is wrong in claiming that all literature
is fictional, which is apparently a misunderstand-
ing of Beardsley on Carroll’s part.45
Second, not all assertions in fictions are repre-
sentations of illocutionary acts. For example,
in many fictional works there are passages about
scientific knowledge, history, or philosophical
doctrines. It is inappropriate to say that in these
cases the author is always pretending to assert.
Carroll is mistaken in considering only inten-
tional representation. Recall that Beardsley’s reason
for treating a fictional work as an illocutionary-
act representation is that there are always infeli-
city conditions of illocutionary-act performance
present in such a work. In that case, the literary
utterance tends to end up with a representation.
As said, this includes both cases of intentional
and unintentional representation. It may be true
that sometimes the author indeed aimed to assert
instead of merely pretending to assert; however,
the act eventually ends up with a representation,
because there are always marks of fictionality that
remove its illocutionary force.
The third objection has it that the thesis projec-
tion in a serious literary work, seen as a perfor-
mance of illocutionary act, is not always pretended.
It would be absurd to say that when Sartre wrote
Nausea he was just pretending to suggest philoso-
phical ideas.
Again, the real reason for treating Sartre’s work
as representation is that his utterance satisfies the
conditions of representation, not that he must have
the intention to represent. To reject Beardsley’s
claim that every fictional work is a representation,
what one should do is reject the obtaining condi-
tions he identifies, not reject the assumption that
all authors must have the intention to represent in
every case, which Beardsley also denies.
S.-Y. Lin
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The fourth objection is that convention cannot
settle all interpretative inquiries. Questions about
character construction and its function in the
overall design of the work can be answered only
by appeal to the real author, rather than to the
implicit speaker who can be understood only via
conventions.
This is a big point of debate. Beardsley could
maintain that appeal to authorial intent is still
dispensable because textual evidence is sufficient
for us to consider character construction and
function. If we really need a notion of author, one
based on textual evidence will still be an option
for the anti-intentionalist. Defending Beardsley,
Daniel O. Nathan is basically holding this view
when he draws on the concept of the ideal
author, whose nature is mainly based on textual
evidence.46
Dickie’s and Carroll’s main concerns are with
interpretation, while Joseph Margolis’s target is
the speech act theory itself. Margolis criticizes a
series of speech act theorists, including Beardsley.
He specifies four confusions in the pretense theory
of literature.47
First, verbal imitation is not itself a speech
act but an adverbial qualification of it, better
described as ‘‘mimickingly.’’ Therefore, Beardsley
is wrong to say that the verbal imitation is a sort
of speech act. Nevertheless, just as we do not say
that a mime climbs a ladder mimickingly, so we do
not say that a stage actress speaks mimickingly. We
say that she imitates the speaking of the fictional
character. To imitate or to mimic is verbal rather
than adverbial in either case. If the stage actress
is just speaking mimickingly, what kind of speech
act is she performing? Margolis does not say. And
verbal imitation still seems to be the answer.
Second, not all categories of poetry are fictional
discourses, and we cannot even assume that all
literary writers have the intention to pretend when
composing. These criticisms are again misrepre-
sentations of Beardsley’s view that I have already
clarified.48
Third, based on the first and second objections,
it would be better to understand literary distinc-
tions in terms of styles or genres rather than as
speech acts.
Surprisingly, Beardsley had tried to show that
the concept of style can still be accommodated in
the speech act model.49 He distinguishes between
dominant (primary) and subordinate (secondary)
illocutionary acts (either real or fictional). For
example, Caesar’s famous triple locutionary act ‘‘I
came, I saw, I conquered’’ not only makes three
dominant illocutionary acts of assertion, but also
makes a subordinate one of asserting that, for him,
to arrive was to act. This latter act is subordinate
to the other three. Subordinate illocutionary acts
can be multiple, as it is possible that one single
illocutionary act is accompanied by several im-
plicit ones.
Drawing on this distinction, a stylistic feature
is thus defined as a feature of any linguistic form
that enables a subordinate illocutionary action.
Difference in style means difference in meaning;
sameness in meaning means sameness in style.
The view that authors can express the same thing
in different styles is faulted. To say something in a
different way is basically to say that thing plus
something else because a stylistic feature is tied to
subordinate illocutionary acts.50
As for the concept of genre, Beardsley hints,
but not clearly advocates, that a genre could be
defined in virtue of the style commonly found in
it.51 That is, a genre G can be defined by a set S of
which certain linguistic features are members.
Margolis’s final objection is that the mimetic
theory confuses imitating a speech act with
speaking poetically, and with imagining someone
speaking. Let us consider the first kind of confu-
sion. Margolis claims that there is no reason to
suppose that it is not the author herself speaking
poetically. But the point is, as long as any marks
of fictionality are discerned in one’s utterance,
those marks qualify the utterance as a representa-
tion. That is how Beardsley draws a line between
fictional works and nonfictional ones, and also
between someone who is imitating a speech act
and who is speaking poetically.
Margolis claims further that there is also no
reason to suppose that the author is reporting
anything about any speaker: ‘‘he is simply speak-
ing, though not necessarily speaking simply.’’ This
‘‘simply speaking’’ oversimplifies speaking. If the
speaker is not speaking as herself, she is then
representing someone else speaking, that is, the
implicit speaker in the story.
The second sort of confusion is a key point.
According to Margolis, it is wrong to conflate
‘‘reporting what an imaginary speaker ‘has said’
(granting the fiction) and creating a poem in
which an imaginary speaker speaks.’’ Instead of
Beardsley on literature, fiction and nonfiction
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representing an illocutionary act, what an author
really does in telling a story is to imagine a
fictional world in which characters speak to each
other. To imagine this world is a distinct act,
but it is not a speech act. Margolis concludes
that ‘‘the fictional use of language concerns the
presuppositions that inform a set of speech acts, not
those speech acts themselves.’’
Now, writing a work (be it fictional or nonfic-
tional) necessarily involves intentional text pro-
duction, and in performing this very act the
author intends to say something. In that case, it
is hard to see why this act is not itself a speech act.
The author of a fictional work creates or imagines
a world by representing what a fictional narrator
has said. If she just imagines a story in her mind,
that does not involve any fictional use of language;
once she outputs her imaginings into words, this
very act is suitably perceived as a speech act.
Put another way, in writing a fictional work, the
author performs a speech act that informs us of an
imagined world.
Margolis’s objection reflects a fundamental
disagreement in the debate on literary interpreta-
tion: whether writing a literary work counts as an
utterance or not. If the answer is positive, produ-
cing a literary work will no doubt be a speech act.
I will not pursue the issue here.
INTERPRETING FICTION AND
NONFICTION AGAIN
Once we treat a fictional work as an illocution-
ary-act representation, our interpretative task
becomes that of constructing the act likely to
have been performed, based on textual clues.52
Reconstruction in this case does not make sense, for
the illocutionary act in question is only pretended,
one that falls short of being; there is no actual act
to be reconstructed at all. Rather, our goal is to
construct the act by relying on textual evidence to
supply its missing conditions.
By contrast, the reconstructionist position can be
described as follows:
An ordinary text . . . belongs to a set of
circumstances, or an encompassing situa-
tional context. If we are in doubt about what
it says*that is, about exactly what illocu-
tionary actions were being performed in the
act of composing it*our task is to reconstruct
the situational context and examine the act-
generating conditions that were present.
Though we can always in principle distin-
guish between the question: Which illocu-
tionary actions did the author perform? And
the question: Which illocutionary actions did
the author intend to perform, we are often
mainly interested in the latter . . . if we take a
poem as a text that is to be interpreted in this
reconstructionist fashion, we will study the
letters of the author and the memoirs of his
friends.53
Once we take this stance, the interpretative
interest typically shifts from textual meaning to
authorial meaning; that is, we would be more
interested in the illocutionary act the author in-
tended to perform than in the one she did perform.
This is because an illocutionary act is an act
of communication, and typically the audience’s
goal is to grasp what the utterer actually intends
to say. In that case, research into biographical
data and other types of external evidence becomes
necessary.
A problem to be solved first is whether the
intentionalism described above is really a brand
of intentionalism as such. In the contemporary
debate of literary interpretation, intentionalism
subdivides into actual intentionalism and hypo-
thetical intentionalism. An important feature of
the former is that it allows authorial intent to
be constitutive of textual meaning. For example,
extreme intentionalism maintains that authorial
meaning is identical to textual meaning.54 Modest
intentionalism allows authorial intent to be a
necessary component of successfully produced
textual meaning.55 In the case of hypothetical
intentionalism, authorial intent is better described
as relevant to, rather than constitutive of, meaning,
in the sense that meaning-determination involves
hypothesizing authorial intent.56
The version described in the present context
seems to be very different. Beardsley denies that a
speaker’s intention is constitutive of, or is relevant
to, meaning with respect to language in general,
including illocutions.
Perhaps we can call the Beardsleyan intentionalism
quasi-intentionalism, which denies that the author’s
intention can affect meaning-determination in any
way, while allowing an interest in retrieving it. This
position qualifies as one sort of weak intentionalism
as Beardsley does worry about it:
Textual meaning is not reducible to authorial
meaning. But does it take precedence over it?
We have not yet established the full authority
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of the text. For if the two meanings are not
identical, then there are two possible inter-
pretation-tasks . . . which of them is the
proper function of the literary interpreter?
No one can deny that there are many
practical occasions on which our task is pre-
cisely to try to discover authorial meaning, or
intention . . ..57
The problem at hand becomes whether Beards-
ley can consistently hold the following claims: (1)
quasi-intentionalism is appropriate for interpret-
ing illocutions; (2) nonfictional works are illocu-
tions; (3) we should hold anti-intentionalism on
interpreting literary works. Two considerations
might save Beardsley from inconsistency.
First, prior to the speech act argument, Beards-
ley presents many others against intentionalism,
all of which are directed at literary works in
general, not just fictional works. Even if the speech
act argument fails to ward off quasi-intentionalism,
his other arguments might still do so.
Second, Beardsley actually has a response to
quasi-intentionalism. With regard to literature
(and actually all the arts), our main task is to dig
out textual meaning rather than authorial mean-
ing, even though in ordinary life the latter concerns
us more. That is to say, literary interpretation
is a special case in which the interpreter has to
take a robust anti-intentionalist stance even on
illocutions.
Adopting the above moves sacrifices (2). I want
to argue that it is possible for Beardsley to
accommodate quasi-intentionalism within his fra-
mework without violating the anti-intentionalist
strictures he wants. The moral of my formula-
tion is that even for the most unyielding anti-
intentionalist some degree of intentionalism may
prove helpful and perhaps even necessary.
Beardsley actually makes four concessions that
allow for quasi-intentionalism. I will show them
one by one before considering how they variously
apply to the interpretation of fictional and non-
fictional works and how they together form a
sound interpretative strategy compatible with
anti-intentionalism.
It is true that the initial aim of the intentional
fallacy was to expose the fallacious use and
irrelevance of biographical data (external evidence)
in interpretation.58 Apparently, the word ‘‘fallacy’’
is not used here in its technical sense. It does not
explicitly refer to a certain pattern of inference
(although this inference pattern might be implicitly
assumed); rather, it refers to some illegitimate
action, that is, the appeal to authorial intent. This
is what the dilemma argument in the notorious
article ‘‘Intentional Fallacy’’ really shows: either
an intention is successfully realized in the work
or it fails; if an intention is successfully realized
in the work, there is no need to consult external
authorial intent; if it fails, it turns out to be
something outside the work; therefore, either way
appeal to external evidence of authorial intent
is irrelevant to interpretation.59 This reading is
supported by the fact that external evidence is seen
as illegitimate.60
But do not forget that Beardsley legitimizes the
use of intermediate evidence, which is about:
. . . the character of the author or about
private or semi-private meanings attached
to words or topics by an author or by a
coterie of which he is a member. The mean-
ing of words is the history of words, and the
biography of an author, his use of a word,
and the associations which the word had for
him, are part of the word’s history and
meaning.61
The use of intermediate evidence does not
involve (full-fledged) intentionalism. It may be
evidence of what the author intended; more impor-
tantly, it is also evidence of the meaning of her
utterance. This concession consequently grants
us some room for talking about biographical data
and authorial intent, as it involves probing into
not only the histories of the words used in the text
but also the topics to which private associations are
attached.
In later discussion Beardsley loosens the stric-
tures more. He begins to allow full consultation
of external evidence, with the proviso that the
inference from external evidence to probable inten-
tions be tested against textual or internal evi-
dence.62 This move presupposes what Beardsley
calls the Principle of Autonomy: ‘‘literary works are
self-sufficient entities, whose properties are deci-
sive in checking interpretations and judgments.’’63
As meaning is an important property of a literary
work, the work enjoys autonomy with respect
to meaning. A literary work, construed as a
text, acquires meaning in terms of the linguistic
conventions of the words used in it, not affected
by external factors and hence enjoying semantic
autonomy.
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The significance of licensing full appeal to
external evidence lies in an apparent but often
neglected fact accepted by Beardsley: the author’s
intention, when successfully realized, codeter-
mines meaning. This is indeed implied in the
dilemma argument. Accurately speaking, a suc-
cessful intention of the author can never alone
determine meaning because convention is suffi-
cient for doing the job. But since authorial intent
still plays some role here, consultation of it seems
natural, legitimate, even if dispensable. Stephen
Davies puts this point well:
Wimsatt and Beardsley do not argue that
it is fallacious to consult far-flung evidence
of an author’s intentions in arriving at inter-
pretations of a work, provided that what is
uncovered is tested against what is manifestly
in the work. We can easily overlook inter-
pretationally relevant features of the work
and recourse to data about its author’s in-
tentions could be helpful in guarding against
this danger. In other words, Wimsatt and
Beardsley hold that an author’s intentions
never alone determine the contents of a
work, but this does not entail that reference
to those intentions can’t help us to detect
meanings that have been conveyed success-
fully to the work.64
This involves a move away from the initial sense
of intentional fallacy. This can be seen from
how Beardsley reidentifies the intentional fallacy:
making an inference from the author’s intentions
(premises) to textual meaning (conclusion).65
In other words, the real intentional fallacy is about
the misidentification of textual meaning with
authorial meaning, not about the appeal to external
evidence.66
This concession results in licensing the first
part of the intentionalist argument: inductive
inferences from biographical data to intentions.
This grants enough space for an interest in author-
ial meaning. If one is allowed to explore biographi-
cal data fully and infer authorial intent, what else
can one do except reconstruct it? The admission of
testing probable intentions against textual evidence
is especially significant in the case of nonfictional
works. This is because such works always refer
to reality, and we would be very interested in the
discrepancies between what the author intended
to say about the real world as contrasted with what
she ends up saying.
The third concession is more explicitly stated.
To support the view that literary interpretation
should aim for textual meaning rather than author-
ial meaning, Beardsley supplies two arguments.67
The first concerns the unavailability of authorial
intent and the second is about aesthetic satisfac-
tion resulting from understanding the work itself.
Nevertheless, Beardsley admits that the first argu-
ment is inconclusive and the second ‘‘takes for
granted quite a few assumptions about art and
aesthetics.’’ Worried about ‘‘the stiffness and form-
ality of my purported demonstration,’’ Beardsley
makes the concession that modest importation
of authorial intent is admissible.68 This is not to
allow authorial intent to constitute textual meaning
in any way; rather, the importation is taken to be
an informative extension. Given that the bound-
aries of textual meaning tend to be vague, it is
not always clear what is assumed in, or excluded
from, the text. In other words, Beardsley here is not
granting authorial intent the role of meaning-
shaping but is moderately allowing the considera-
tion of it to enrich criticisms where no obvious
conflicts with textual evidence occur.
The fourth concession is significant, as it under-
mines semantic autonomy, the principle that
textual features of a literary work are sufficient
for determining meaning. Now recall the first part
of Beardsley’s speech act argument: speaker’s
intention is not constitutive of illocutionary mean-
ing. Though Beardsley believes this sub-argument
to be correct, he leaves room for doubting its
conclusiveness. He suspects that some sort of
intention might be constitutive of the illocutionary
act being performed in some cases. For example,
the intention to deceive might be requisite for
lying.69 Beardsley hesitates about such autonomy
in the case of illocutions. Once this point is
acknowledged, the author’s intention will be partly
constitutive of meaning: it will partly play a role
in determining which illocutionary act the author
performs.
Certainly this last concession has gone further
than quasi-intentionalism, which does not reject
semantic autonomy. And as the most important
contention Beardsley wants to secure (and other
debaters want to attack) is semantic autonomy,
I do not think that we should interpret his doubt
as certainty. But given the indecisiveness raised, I
do think that it leaves some room for importation
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of authorial intent, in a different way from the
second concession. The critic may be granted
more room for speculating about textual meaning
based on probable authorial intentions where
textual clues are indecisive. But this will be
speculation only, and by the anti-intentionalist
strictures we should still maintain that the text in
this case is ambiguous in nature.70
The four concessions outlined above form a
qualified version of quasi-intentionalism (I will call
it QQI hereafter). It is qualified because it does
not grant a primary role of speaker’s meaning in
criticism. Consideration of speaker’s meaning is
dependent upon that of textual meaning, as the
four concessions all assume textual meaning as
the basis on which further thought on speaker’s
meaning becomes possible.
Now, let us see how the above discussion links
to fiction and nonfiction, and how it may help
resolve the inconsistency exposed so far in Beards-
ley’s framework, along with the stiffness and
formality with which he feels uneasy.
Beardsley’s main worry about quasi-intentionalism
is that a critic should not make the reconstruction
of authorial meaning dominant in her criticism.
Though it is unclear how much a critic can deal
with reconstruction explicitly, it can be reasonably
assumed that Beardsley does not completely
exclude talk about the author, so long as one
makes a clear distinction between what the
author intends to say and what is actually said. In
Beardsley’s terms, this is the distinction between non-
intentionalistic criticism and intentionalistic criticism.
When a critic talks intentionalistically, she never
uses the subject terms ‘‘the artist’’ and ‘‘the work’’
discriminately and tends to mix up evidence of
intention with evidence of work meaning.71
Ideally, references to the author should be
avoided, and the critic should all along focus on
textual meaning. There seems to be no problem
with this ideal applied in the case of the inter-
pretation of fictional works. Given that authorial
intent is ontologically detached from reference in
the representational framework, we may renounce
the talk about reconstruction. Analogically speak-
ing, probably not many people would bother to
inquire into what a mime intended to imitate in a
performance, not to mention that her biography
would shed little light on what she would like to
imitate.
But in the case of nonfictional works, we have
more license to allocate space for authorial intent,
because these are based on illocutions instead of
mere imitations. And this is legitimately allowed
by QQI: the critic is free to explore private
associations by looking into the author’s biogra-
phy, to compare authorial meaning with textual
meaning, to enrich textual meaning with biogra-
phical data, and to speculate about textual mean-
ing based on such data*where these moves are
relevant. Beardsley’s worry that authorial meaning
would take precedence over textual meaning is
not quite justified, because these concessions do
not fully justify giving it that precedence. Their
shared premise is that talk about authorial intent
is dependent on what is already said in the text.
It is not possible to engage the former without
the latter. Certainly in practice it is hard to draw a
clear line between moderation and excessiveness,
but to argue that there is, hence, no such a dis-
tinction would commit a decision-point fallacy.72
I sum up for Beardsley three critical principles
that emerge from what has been discussed so far.
First, external evidence is in theory not essential
to interpreting fictional works. As just mentioned,
the ideal is to focus on the work itself rather than
on its creator, which has been the central tenet
of anti-intentionalism. Nevertheless, this does not
entail an ultimate exclusion of authorial intent
from interpreting fictional works, assuming that
QQI is at work.
Second, reconstruction of authorial intent is
encouraged, if not necessary, in the case of nonfic-
tional works. Literary illocutions are still illocu-
tions, and QQI satisfies our interest in digging
out speaker’s meaning when interpreting them
without losing ground to intentionalism as such.
This leaves room for a flexible approach to criti-
cism of nonfictional works.
Third, a critic should keep talking non-inten-
tionalistically, that is, objectively, instead of in-
tentionalistically, so that no confusion of authorial
meaning with textual meaning occurs. This is a
crucial caveat to bear in mind. If we are to put
QQI in practice, the distinction has to be made all
the time to avoid shading into intentionalism.
Beardsley’s biggest concern is what Carroll calls
the constitutive question: what constitutes the mean-
ing of the work?73 A significant part of the debate
of literary interpretation and most of Beardsley’s
Beardsley on literature, fiction and nonfiction
11
(page number not for citation purpose)
arguments are directed to answering that question,
including the speech act argument. Once the
core of anti-intentionalism is secured, Beardsley
need not worry about the residue of intentionalism
implicated in the speech act theory because he can
still make it compatible with the anti-intentionalist
tenet.
CONTEXT AND PRAGMATICS
Before offering the speech act account of litera-
ture, Beardsley is apparently a formalist and anti-
pragmatist in regard to literary interpretation. He
is only interested in the work itself and shows
indifference to external factors embedded in the
context of the work’s production. The work enjoys
full autonomy and remains aloof from outside
influences.
However, the introduction of the speech act
theory to anti-intentionalism damages such auton-
omy and suspiciously results in contextualism,
the view that the identity and meaning of a
work partly depend upon the relations it holds to
the contextual factors present at the time of
its production. As claimed, to grasp the meaning
of an illocution, one will have to consider the
pragmatic context in which the text was produced
in order to identify the act-generating conditions
constitutive of meaning. In the case of nonfic-
tional works, this is tantamount to saying that
textual meaning can only be pinned down by
appealing to contextual factors, excluding authorial
intent. This move seriously undermines semantic
autonomy.
One way to save Beardsley’s theory would be
to hold a weaker version of the principle of
autonomy with respect to nonfictional works and
to claim that contextual considerations, excluding
the author’s semantic intentions, do contribute to
textual meaning. This appears to commit Beards-
ley to some form of contextualism, but one might
think that even Beardsley’s conventionalism itself
is already a weak form of contextualism: if a text
is in a given language, that immediately makes its
possible meanings context-dependent. A problem
of this approach is that the exclusion of authorial
intent from contextual factors seems dogmatic.74
But some theories of interpretation based on
contextualism*for example, hypothetical in-
tentionalism*do take this line,75 and it has been
argued that Beardsley’s account differs from
hypothetical intentionalism more in degree than
in kind.76
Considerations of context lead to deep issues in
the ontology of art: does the meaning and identity
of a work change across time? Some philosophers
argue that context continues to affect a work’s
identity and that when context changes, the
work crucially alters while reaming self-identical.
For example, Shakespeare’s Macbeth has gener-
ated different meanings in different contexts while
remaining self-identical. This view, dubbed by
Davies the modern context theory, is appealing for
those who deny the idea of a text as a stable
center.77
The debate is still ongoing within philoso-
phical aesthetics. And it is of interest to note
that Beardsley paradoxically shows leanings to
the modern context theory; he accepts that work
meaning changes as convention changes in a
different sociohistorical setting.78 This interesting
fact is discussed and seen by Richard Shusterman
as a way for Beardsley to leave room for continuing
interpretation of a work.79
This also echoes the suggestion made earlier that
tries to reconcile Beardsley’s view with a certain
form of contextualism. The above discussion shows
that Beardsley’s anti-intentionalism still has the
potential to come to terms with the recent trends
such as literary pragmatics and contextualism.
A fuller account is yet to be formulated.
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